At a critical time regionally, the results expected from Erdogan's visit to Cairo today could be very important.
The Turkish President's visit is aimed at rewarming Cairo-Ankara relations, on a win-win basis, bringing them out of the freeze they have been in for the last decade
"Blurred landscape" in M. East
The above is reported by International Media which then points out:
"Regional and global competition sometimes overlooks the economic interests of both Egypt and Turkey, as when the US proposed the idea of an overland transport route between India and Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
The Gaza war has also complicated regional interactions, such as the normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations under a three-way Saudi-Israeli-US agreement that would also guarantee Saudi security, a smooth transition of power from the king to successor and to secure future US promises of a Palestinian state as a result of a peace deal that cannot currently be achieved.
Here, Erdogan can coordinate with Egypt to play an important role in these interactions in order to maintain Turkey's image as a regional power, both vis-à-vis the West and in the eyes of the Turkish people.
Turkey's military exports as a tool of influence
Turkey's military and economic capabilities compared to the rest of the Middle East allow it to exert influence as a strong regional power, able to implement policies independent of international powers.
Turkish military exports, especially drones and guided missiles, have become essential tools of this influence, notably in shaping pro-Turkish military confrontations in Libya, Syria, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and Ukraine.
Countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Morocco, are racing to acquire these drones.
Qatar has even bought a Turkish factory to produce tanks.
The Turkish foreign minister recently announced his country's intention to supply Egypt with drones and their manufacturing technology as part of military cooperation projects to be discussed during Erdogan's visit.
The current phase of relations between the two countries presents Egyptian policymakers with several bilateral and regional issues that need to be analyzed in terms of their implications in relation to their country's interests.
Egypt-Turkey points of common interest
It is a fact that Turkey has been involved economically and militarily in several conflict-affected areas, particularly in areas related to Egypt, namely Libya, Ethiopia and Syria.
Libya
It is clear that the US and many European parties are encouraging a political compromise between the Eastern and Western Libyan factions to control the country's oil and gas wealth.
Turkish officials have expressed a willingness to reach an agreement with Egypt on Libya.
Both Egypt and Turkey are unlikely to abandon their Libyan allies or their fair share of Libyan resources and their relative weight in forming the new government.
Indirect mention in the Turkish-Libyan memorandum
Egypt does not need to change its position, rejecting agreements concluded by the governments of Fayez Al-Sarraj and Abdul-Hamid Dbeibeh with Turkey, regarding maritime borders or Turkish exploitation of Libyan oil and gas fields.
But he can negotiate with Turkey that facilitates a Libyan political solution, allowing Libyan parties to form a new government that takes into account Egyptian, Turkish, Western and Russian interests.
Additionally, agreements can be made for Turkish and Egyptian companies to cooperate on projects in Eastern and Western Libya on an equal basis, while ensuring Libyan political support and funding for these projects.
Ethiopian compromise instead of Turkish EEZ in the SE Mediterranean
Regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Turkey is Ethiopia's second largest investor after China, with more than 200 Turkish companies operating in the country. The latter also receives Turkish military aid that helped its government win the recent civil war in Ethiopia.
Thus, Turkey can play a role in persuading the Ethiopian government to accept a compromise with Egypt on the Nile issue.
In return, Egypt could leverage the alliances it has forged in the Eastern Mediterranean with both Greece and Cyprus to facilitate a process that allows Turkey access to a share of the natural gas in the waters that separate it from these countries, without getting involved in legal disputes over agreements that have been in place for a century.
This requires emulating the model of the Lebanese-Israeli agreement reached to divide offshore gas fields between them with the mediation of the US and the help of French and Italian gas companies and Qatar. Lebanon and Israel do not yet have diplomatic relations.
Syria and Turkish arms exports to Egypt
Normalizing relations with Turkey and strengthening cooperation with the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria could also pave the way for Egypt's participation in negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Syrian civil war, dealing with the refugee crisis and achieving international security guarantees in northern Syria.
Bilaterally, a billion-dollar Turkish credit line to finance Turkish exports and projects in Egypt could be revived.
Another frozen deal was signed between Erdogan and President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi (when he was defense minister in May 2013) to extend a $200 million facility to finance Turkish arms purchases from Egypt and joint military production projects.
Such agreements can be reviewed to finance projects such as the import and production of Turkish drones, transport vehicles and electric cars in Egypt
Business opportunities
In 2011, the Arab gas pipeline that runs from Egypt to Jordan, Israel and Syria was about 100 kilometers away from reaching Turkish soil.
The two countries are now preparing to use this line to supply Egyptian gas to Lebanon and are considering using it in both directions, which in the long term opens the door for its connection to the Turkish grid, which will receive large quantities of Russian natural gas over the next few years.
Erdogan's plan
Applying the "drone diplomacy" with Egypt and the cooperation of the defense industries of the two countries, the Turkish President attempts to associate Egypt in Libya and the SE Mediterranean, on a win-win basis, destroying the Egypt-Greece alliance.
This will free his hands to take action in the alleged Libyan EEZ south of Crete, according to the provisions of the illegal "Turkish-Libyan memorandum", bringing the floating drilling rig Abdulhamid Khan accompanied by Turkish warships to the area, without encountering a reaction from Egypt, separating her from Greece.
It will then attempt, following the standards of the illegal "Turkish-Libyan memorandum", to draw up a similar one with Egypt, delimiting their EEZs further east of the 28th meridian, including the maritime area of Rhodes-Katelorizou-Cyprus-Crete, stealing part of the Greek and Cypriot EEZs.
