Armed Conflicts
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"A step" before a generalised war between Israel and Hezbollah - The civil-military targets to be hit and the results

Many believe that after the end of the war with Hamas, Netanyahu will turn against Hezbollah, opening a new war front in the North of his country.

The possibility of a generalized Israel-Hezbollah conflict is growing

Recall that since the very next day after Hamas' October 7, 2023 terrorist attack on innocent Israeli civilians, Hezbollah in solidarity with the Palestinian organization has been hitting targets in the Israeli north on an almost daily basis, with Israel responding with small-scale airstrikes with fighter jets and drones on a daily basis.

However, in recent days Israeli attacks have ramped up, foreshadowing an imminent Israeli storming of Hezbollah and a generalized conflict.

The reasons are that, the Israeli Prime Minister "sees" the war against Hezbollah as a lifeline for his political survival and that he believes that now is the right timing for Israel to end its hostile neighbors, ensuring a return to normalcy for Israeli citizens living in towns and villages in the north of the country , on the border with Lebanon.


The question that arises is what will be the results and consequences of a generalised Israel-Hezbollah war?

To this question International Media attempts to answer this question, pointing out:

 The objectives of Hezbollah and Israel 

"An all-out war between Hezbollah and Israel would bring the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) facing the missile threat and artillery of Hezbollah from the north, Hamas (even) from the direction of the south and the Houthis from the eastern side of Israel via the Red Sea.

If the Israeli army attacks through the Golan Heights - which seems increasingly likely - Hezbollah will launch a multi-layered attack against northern Israel.

The US will fully assist the IDF and Israel's elite Special Operations Units, such as Sayeret Matkal 154 and Shayetet 13.

In retaliation, Hezbollah will "load" with ATGM like Kornet, the areas near the disputed Shebaa farms, between the "Blue Line" and the Litani River , which is of great strategic importance for Lebanon's agriculture, irrigation, industry.

Hezbollah has already caused military damage to Israel by striking Meron airbase , along with targeting other military installations in northern Israel.

Hezbollah missiles are likely to attack Israeli towns such as Kiryat Shmona (an electrical, industrial and tourist hub in the Hula Valley), Nabatieh and Ghajar .

Hezbollah is likely to fire Katyusha missiles (as it usually does in the Golan) and may deploy SRBMs such as the Fateh-110 that can strike right up to the northern edge of the Negev.


Israel's rapid response would probably include strikes on Bazourieh, the Aadous plain where Hezbollah's ammunition and supply depots are located, the village of Buday (in Baalbek) and the Bekaa valley - all Hezbollah strongholds.

The Israeli Army would also target the southern and eastern regions of Lebanon and would also target Aleppo and Eastern Syria , destroying Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) weapons depots.

 The Hezbollah-Sunni and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) alliance against Israel

Strategic and tactical alliances will also be established, even if only temporarily, as in any war.

Hezbollah will get closer to the regional entities and assets of the IRGC.

Hezbollah would join forces with al-Jamah al-Islamiyah and the elite Quwwat al-Fajr (Dawn Forces) in Lebanon, which are Sunni forces loyal to Turkey and Qatar, bridging a Sunni-Shiite antagonism, for the time being.

Hezbollah would strengthen the relationship with the Hamas wing in Lebanon, known as Tala'i Tawfan al-Aqsa (Guardians of the Flood of Al-Aqsa), and strengthen arms deals with IRGC factions in Syria and Iraq, smuggled through the Bekaa Valley.

Tel Aviv is known to have seized Palestinian offshore gas reserves in Gaza, and is "looking" to Lebanon's Block 9 and its oil and gas exploration potential.

The "Lebanon Basin" is estimated to have 25 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves.

The recent war in Gaza has shown that firing multiple rockets at the same time saturates the Israeli Iron Dome, which is unable to shoot them all down, resulting in some Israeli targets being hit. 

Nevertheless, it is Israel's air power that will give it a superior advantage, as the protection range of Hezbollah's anti-aircraft is short, and their numbers are limited.

For example, Israeli fighter jets hit two Hezbollah military command centres in Baalbek, a military complex in Khiam and infrastructure in Bint Jbeil and Nabi Chit.

Damage and problems that Hezbollah may cause

An all-out war is unwise for Israel, as Hezbollah is far more resilient, powerful, trained, numerous and armed than Hamas.

Hezbollah can cause significant damage to Israel. It can strike lethally at the Ramat Hovav industrial chemical zone, triggering toxic chemical clouds throughout northern Israel.

Hezbollah possesses surface-to-surface missiles, such as the 300-kilometer range Yakhont missile, which can be used to strike Israel's recently erected (controversial) gas rigs in the Leviathan gas field in the Mediterranean.

It could also endanger commercial shipping to and from Israeli ports, along Houthi lines, in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.

A Hezbollah-Houthi alliance could disrupt Israel's logistics line at the port of Eilat, perched at the nerve centre of Jordan's only coastal access point to Aqaba, providing Tel Aviv with an eastern sea route via Suez.

Hezbollah can similarly cause security problems in Israel's Mediterranean ports, such as Haifa, which is Israel's main gateway to the rest of the world, and the port of Ashdod.

Finally, it can cause problems in air communications and "short-circuit" a huge chunk of its energy production (for example, the power plants of the Israel Electric Company) by damaging factories and other key economic activities through rocket artillery and missiles instead of aircraft."

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